ABSTRACT. This paper provides an alternative approach to the theory of dynamic programming, designed to accommodate the kinds of recursive preference specifications that have become popular in economic and financial analysis, while still supporting traditional additively separable rewards. The approach exploits the theory of monotone convex operators, which turns out to be well suited to dynamic maximization. The intuition is that convexity is preserved under maximization, so convexity properties found in preferences extend naturally to the Bellman operator.
INTRODUCTION
Through a combination of theory and analysis of observational and experimental data, economists have constructed progressively more realistic representations of agents and their choices. In the context of intertemporal choice, these preferences have come to include such features as independent sensitivity to intertemporal substitution and intratemporal risk (see, e.g., Kreps and Porteus (1978) or Epstein and Zin (1989) ), desire for robustness (Hansen and Sargent (2008) ), the impact of narrow framing (Barberis et al. (2006) , Barberis and Huang (2009) ) and sensitivity to ambiguity (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , Epstein and Schneider (2008) , Klibanoff et al. (2009) , Hayashi and Miao (2011) , Ju and Miao (2012) , Strzalecki (2013) While some of these models have found significant popularity in applied research, 2 traditional additively separable preferences with linear certainty equivalents still form the backbone of applied and quantitative work. This is partly due to the fact that optimal choice in the traditional setting is much better understood (see, e.g., Bellman (1957) or Blackwell (1965) ). Specifications involving nonlinear recursive preferences have proved harder to handle. While early attempts to treat nonlinear recursive preferences in a discrete time dynamic programming framework used the contraction mapping arguments that had proved successful for additively separable models (see, e.g., Lucas and Stokey (1984) ), it was soon realized that the Bellman operators generated by the most common recursive preference specifications are not supremum norm contractions, implying that the classical theory typified by Blackwell (1965) cannot be employed.
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This realization drove a second wave of theoretical analysis on dynamic programming in the context of nonlinear recursive preferences, built instead around monotonicity and concavity. For example, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010) exploited monotonicity and concavity to obtain a range of deep results on existence and uniqueness of recursive utilities. Le Van et al. (2008) adapted the theory of monotone concave operators, as pioneered by Krasnoselskii (1964) and coauthors, to dynamic programming problems. Marinacci and Montrucchio (2017) and Bloise and Vailakis (2018) further extended these ideas. Like contraction maps, under certain regularity conditions, monotone concave operators have unique and globally attracting fixed points-a highly attractive property in the context of dynamic programming. 4 However, while we now have a good understanding of existence and uniqueness of recursive utilities-that is, results showing that the preference specifications are well defined at a fixed consumption path or policy-our understanding of optimality in the 2 For example, the recursive preference specification of Epstein and Zin (1989) forms a core component of the quantitative asset pricing literature, while also finding use in applications ranging from optimal taxation to fiscal policy and business cycles. See, for example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) , Hansen and Sargent (2008) or Schorfheide et al. (2018) . 3 In addition to Lucas and Stokey (1984) , related work can be found in Boyd (1990) , Durán (2003) , Le Van and Vailakis (2005) and . It was Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010) who emphasized that sup norm contractivity fails for many economically reasonable aggregators, such as Thompson aggregators. 4 This property was also used the show existence of Markov equilibria in the presence of distortions in Datta et al. (2002) , Morand and Reffett (2003) and several related papers. Additional results on existence and uniqueness of recursive utility via monotone concave operators can be found in Becker and Rincón-Zapatero (2017) . Alternative approaches that admit unbounded aggregators are studied in and Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2013) .
context of recursive preferences is less complete. Despite important contributions, foundations have been lacking for some of the most popular specifications for applied work, such as certain empirically relevant parmeterizations of Epstein-Zin preferences, or the narrow framing or ambiguity sensitive preferences discussed above.
In this paper we resolve several of these outstanding problems by developing a set of sufficient conditions for abstract dynamic programs-including both additively separable and recursive preference models-that provide global convergence of the Bellman operator to the value function and optimality of the associated policies. These conditions are applied to a range of recursive preference specifications popular in applied settings, including standard Epstein-Zin models with the constant elasticity of substitution aggregators, risk-sensitive and robust control models, narrow framing models and some kinds of ambiguity sensitive preferences. In each case we show that value function iteration converges uniformly to the value function and that Bellman's principle of optimality is valid.
Our approach builds on the monotone concave approach but with one significant difference: the relevant operators are convex. Put differently, we use monotone convex operators to study the maximization problems associated with dynamic programming.
The main benefit is that, unlike concavity, convexity is preserved under the taking of pointwise suprema. Hence convexity pairs naturally with maximization. Moreover, under suitable conditions, monotone convex operators enjoy all the stability properties possessed by monotone concave operators.
At the same time, we find that the theory of monotone concave operators is ideal for minimization problems. This is because concavity is preserved by minimization, in the sense that the infimum of a family of concave functions is concave. Thus, any concavity inherent in the dynamic program flows naturally into the Bellman operator.
Finally, we note that simple continuous transformations can be used to transform inherently concave problems into convex problems and vice versa. Through these transformations, one can shift between convex maximization problems and concave minimization problems on a case by case basis. In particular, preference specifications that have been recognized as concave can be modified so that they exhibit convexity rather than concavity.
As one extension of our ideas, we also consider an Epstein-Zin recursive preference model with unbounded rewards. Problems with unbounded rewards are difficult to treat in a systematic way. Important innovations tailored to economic applications can be found in Durán (2003) , Le Van and Vailakis (2005) , Rincón-Zapatero and Rodríguez-Palmero (2007), Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010) and Bäuerle and Jaśkiewicz (2018) .
Perhaps the most common approach to treating unbounded rewards in the broader field of dynamic programming has been one involving contraction mapping arguments in a setting of weighted supremum norms (see, e.g., Bertsekas (2013) ). Here we show that similar ideas can be applied when contractivity fails or is difficult to obtain. In particular, we show how one of the results from the preceding sections can be adapted to accommodate unbounded rewards.
One closely related studies to ours is Bloise and Vailakis (2018) , who analyze dynamic programming problems with bounded recursive utility. By exploiting the theory of monotone concave operators, they provide valuable optimality results. We draw on several key ideas and extend their analysis in multiple directions. These include developing an optimality theory for monotone convex operators, adopting transformations that allow for the use of convex operator methods, and providing a treatment of several sophisticated models used in recent quantitative work, including those with narrow framing or ambiguity aversion.
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Another related paper is Guo and He (2017) , who consider an extension to the EpsteinZin recursive utility model that includes utility measures for investment gains and losses. As a part of their study, they obtain results for existence, uniqueness and successive approximations of the solution to the Bellman equation for a portfolio selection problem with gain-loss utility. They provide sharp results under the assumption that the state space is finite and the exogenous state process is irreducible. Our results are significantly broader, applying as they do to a large range of settings outside of portfolio selection problem within the framework of Epstein and Zin (1989) .
Also related is Balbus (2016) , who considers a class of non-negative recursive utilities with certain types of nonlinear aggregators and certainty equivalent operators, and studies the corresponding dynamic programming problem. His results for existence, uniqueness and convergence of solutions to recursive utilities and to the Bellman equation rest upon the theory of monotone α-concave operators. These results are valuable 5 An alternative and related reference for the general theory of dynamic programming with recursive preferences is Marinacci and Montrucchio (2017) , which presents valuable new methods for determining when isotone maps have unique fixed points.
in some instances, although the requisite α-concave property does not hold for a number of popular specifications of recursive utility, such as those of Epstein and Zin (1989) when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution differs from unity.
6 Ozaki and Streufert (1996) provide a comprehensive study of the recovery of recursive preferences and the corresponding dynamic programming problem under a nonMarkovian environment. Their results are useful for studying dynamic programming for non-additive stochastic objectives in a very general setting, although their assumptions also exclude some popular specifications.
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Our paper also has some connection to the recent work by Pavoni et al. (2018) , who introduce a recursive dual approach suitable for limited commitment problems or other incentive-constrained programming problems. The authors construct a dual formulation of the applications they consider, which is recursive and such that the dual Bellman operator is contractive under a Thompson-like metric. Their theory can handle problems where preferences are specified via a general time aggregator and stochastic aggregator. In the problems we consider below, forward looking constraints are absent and we can directly consider the primal optimization problem. This allows us to avoid certain assumptions used to tie the primal problem to the dual and obtain contractivity on the dual side.
We note that our theoretical framework departs from the separate specification of aggregator and certainty equivalent that has been popular in the economic literature since Kreps and Porteus (1978) . Instead we adopt the abstract dynamic programming framework developed and collated by Bertsekas (2013) . In abstract dynamic programming, the most cohesive sufficient conditions are still driven by contractions or semi-contractive properties (see, e.g., Bertsekas (2013) , chapters 2-3). The monotone-convex and monotoneconcave results set out below offer an alternative branch of cohesive and broadly applicable methods.
6 See, e.g., page 8 of Balbus (2016) , as well as the analogous discussion in Le Van et al. (2008) .
7 For example, with Epstein-Zin preferences and elasticity of intertemporal substitution greater than one (as found in, say, Kaplan and Violante (2014) ), the conditions of Theorem D fail, since the parameters related to the variable discount factorδ and δ are infinite. Recently, in a related study based on the biconvergence technique, Bich et al. (2018) establish existence, uniqueness and computation of the solution to the Bellman equation for deterministic dynamic programming problems under certain types of continuity properties imposed on temporal aggregators.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains our main results.
Section 3 has applications. Section 4 considers an extension (unbounded rewards).
Apart from some simple arguments, all proofs are deferred to the appendix.
GENERAL RESULTS
Let X and A be separable metric spaces, called the state and action space respectively. Let R X represent all functions from X to R and let · denote the supremum norm on the bounded functions in R X . For f and g in R X , the statement f g means f (x) g(x)
for all x ∈ X. Let Γ be a nonempty correspondence from X to A, referred to below as the feasible correspondence. We understand Γ(x) as representing all actions available to the controller in state x. The correspondence Γ in turn defines the set of feasible state-action
Let
• w 1 and w 2 be bounded continuous functions in R X satisfying w 1 w 2 ,
• V be all Borel measurable functions v in R X satisfying w 1 v w 2 , and
• C be the continuous functions in V .
Both V and C are understood as classes of candidate value functions. The functions w 1 and w 2 serve as lower and upper bounds for lifetime value respectively. Their role will be clarified below.
Current and future payoffs are subsumed into a state-action aggregator Q, which maps a feasible state-action pair (x, a) and function v in V into a real value Q(x, a, v). The interpretation of Q(x, a, v) is total lifetime rewards, contingent on current action a, current state x and the use of v to evaluate future states. In other words, Q(x, a, v) corresponds to the right hand side of the Bellman equation when v represents the value function.
The central role of convexity and concavity was discussed in the introduction. To implement the corresponding restrictions, we call Q value-convex if
Similarly, Q will be called value-concave when the reverse inequality holds (i.e., when −Q is value-convex). One of these restrictions will be imposed on each problem we consider.
We also impose some basic properties that will be assumed in every case:
Assumption 2.1. The following conditions hold:
(a) The feasible correspondence Γ is compact valued and continuous.
(b) The map (x, a) → Q(x, a, v) is Borel measurable on G whenever v ∈ V and continuous on G whenever v ∈ C .
(c) The state-action aggregator satisfies
(d) The functions w 1 and w 2 satisfy
for all (x, a) in G. Let Σ be a family of maps from X to A, referred to below as the set of all feasible policies, such that each σ ∈ Σ is Borel measurable and satisfies σ(x) ∈ Γ(x) for all x ∈ X.
Lemma 2.1. The map w(
Proof. Borel measurability of (x, a) → Q(x, a, v) and σ imply that w is Borel measurable on X. Moreover, since w 1 v, the inequalities in (1) and (2) imply
is called a σ-value function. The value v σ (x) can be interpreted as the lifetime value of following policy σ. Its existence and uniqueness are discussed below.
2.1. Maximization. We begin by studying maximization of value. Our key assumption is that the state-action aggregator satisfies value-convexity and possesses a strict upper solution:
Assumption 2.2 (Convex Program). The following conditions are satisfied:
Note that part (b) is a strengthening of one of the conditions in (2).
Proposition 2.2. If assumption 2.2 holds, then, for each σ in Σ, the set V contains exactly one
Proposition 2.2 assures us that the value v σ of a given policy σ is well defined. From this foundation we can introduce optimality concerning a maximization decision problem.
In particular, in the present setting, a policy σ * ∈ Σ is called optimal if
The maximum value function associated with this planning problem is the map v * defined
One can show from conditions (c) and (d) of assumption 2.1 that v * is well defined as a real valued function on X and satisfies w 1 v * w 2 .
A function v ∈ V is said to satisfy the Bellman equation if
The Bellman operator T associated with our abstract dynamic program is a map sending
Since v is in C , existence of the maximum is guaranteed by assumption 2.1. It follows from Berge's theorem of the maximum that Tv is an element of C . Evidently solutions to the Bellman equation in C exactly coincide with fixed points of T.
The convex program conditions lead to the following central result:
Theorem 2.3. If assumption 2.2 holds, then (a) The Bellman equation has exactly one solution in C and that solution is v * .
(c) A policy σ in Σ is optimal if and only if
(d) At least one optimal policy exists.
The fixed point and convergence results for T in theorem 2.3 rely on a fixed point theorem for isotone convex operators due to Du (1989) , reprinted in section 2.1 of Zhang (2012). In those references, convergence is shown to be uniformly geometric, in the sense that there exist constants λ ∈ (0, 1) and K ∈ R such that
2.2. Minimization. Next we treat minimization. In this setting, the convexity and strict upper solution in assumption 2.2 are replaced by concavity and a strict lower solution.
In order to maintain consistency with other sources, we admit some overloading of terminology relative to section 2.1 on maximization. For example, the optimal policy will now reference a minimizing policy rather than a maximizing one, and the Bellman equation will shift from maximization to minimization. The relevant definition will be clear from context.
The next assumption is analogous to assumption 2.2, which was used for maximization.
Assumption 2.3 (Concave Program). The following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Q is value-concave.
Proposition 2.4. If assumption 2.3 holds, then, for each σ in Σ, the set V contains exactly one
Proposition 2.4 mimics proposition 2.2, assuring us that, in the present context, the cost v σ of a given policy σ is well defined. A policy σ * ∈ Σ is then called optimal if
The minimum cost function associated with this planning problem is the function v * de-
The Bellman operator S associated with our abstract dynamic program is a map sending
Analogous to theorem 2.3, we have Theorem 2.5. If assumption 2.3 holds, then (a) The Bellman equation (8) has exactly one solution in C and that solution is the mini-
APPLICATIONS
In this section we study a collection of applications, showing how the general results in section 2 can be used to solve the dynamic programming problems discussed in the introduction.
3.1. An Additively Separable Decision Process. Before treating more sophisticated preference specifications, it is worth noting that the results stated above can be applied in the standard additive separable case, alongside the more traditional BellmanBlackwell contraction mapping approach to dynamic programming. To see this, consider the generic additively separable dynamic programming model of Stokey et al. (1989) with Bellman equation
over (s, z) ∈ S × Z. Here S and Z are compact metric spaces containing possible values for the endogenous and exogenous state variables, respectively. Let the transition function P on Z have the Feller property, let the feasible correspondence Γ : S × Z → S be compact valued and continuous, let F : G → R be continuous, and let β lie in (0, 1).
We translate this model to our environment by taking x := (s, z) to be the state, X := S × Z to be the state space, a = y ∈ S to be the action, and setting
Since F is continuous on a compact set, there exists a finite constant M with |F| M.
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For the bracketing functions w 1 and w 2 we fix ε > 0 and adopt the constant functions
The conditions of assumption 2.1 are all satisfied. Conditions (a) and (b) are true by assumption and condition (c) is trivial to verify. To see that condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds, we note that w 1 and w 2 lie in bcX. In addition, for any given
Similarly,
The last inequality gives not only Q((s, z), y, w 2 ) w 2 (s, z), as required for part (d) of assumption, but also the stronger condition in part (b) of assumption 2.2. Thus, to verify the requirements of theorem 2.3, we need only check the convexity condition in part (a) of assumption 2.2. But this is immediate from the linearity of expectations.
Hence theorem 2.3 applies.
3.2. Epstein-Zin Preferences. Epstein and Zin (1989) propose a specification of lifetime value that separates and independently parameterizes intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion. Value is defined recursively by the CES aggregator
where {C t } is a consumption path, U t is the utility value of the path onward from time t, and R t is the Kreps-Porteus certainty equivalent operator
8 The domain G of F is compact in the product topology by Tychonoff's theorem.
Here, E t stands for the conditional expectation with respect to the period t information. The value 1/ρ represents elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) between the composite good and the certainty equivalent, while γ governs the level of relative risk aversion (RRA) with respect to atemporal gambles. The most empirically relevant case is ρ < γ, implying that the agent prefers early resolution of uncertainty. We focus on this case in what follows.
Under Epstein-Zin preferences, the generic additively separable Bellman equation in (10) becomes
for each (s, z) ∈ S × Z, where, here and below, r(s, y, z) :
We impose the same conditions on the primitives discussed in section 3.1. In particular,
F is continuous, P is Feller, Γ is continuous and compact valued and both S and Z are compact. To ensure F(s, y, z) 1−ρ is always well defined, we also assume that F is everywhere positive.
3.2.1. The Case ρ < γ < 1. As in Hansen and Scheinkman (2012) , we begin with the continuous strictly increasing transformationv = v 1−γ , which allows us to rewrite (11) asv
where
Since this transformation is bijective, there is a one-to-one correspondence between v andv, in the sense that v solves (11) if and only ifv solves (12). Note that in the current setting we have θ ∈ (0, 1).
The state-action aggregator Q corresponding to (12) is
For the bracketing functions w 1 and w 2 , we fix δ > 0 and take the constant functions 
These values are finite and positive, since F is continuous and positive on a compact domain. 9 Being constant, w 1 and w 2 are continuous.
We now show that the conditions of assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are all satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1, condition (a) is true by assumption, while condition (b) follows immediately from the continuity imposed on F and the Feller property of P. Condition (c) is easy to verify, since, for any b > 0, the scalar map
is monotone increasing. To check condition (d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G,
we have
or, with some rearranging,
Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds. In fact, (16) implies that our choice of w 2 also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in (b) of assumption 2.2.
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It only remains to check value-convexity of Q. But this is implied by the convexity of ψ defined in (15), which holds whenever 0 < θ 1, along with linearity of the integral.
The conclusions of theorem 2.3 now follow.
3.2.2. The Case ρ < 1 < γ. To treat this case we again apply the continuous transformationv ≡ v 1−γ to the Bellman equation (11). But now 1 − γ is negative, leading to the minimization problem
9 In this case, positivity of F can be weakened to nonnegativity.
10 To be precise, condition (b) holds when ε :
for each (s, z) ∈ X. The state-action aggregator Q corresponding to (17) is still as defined in (13). Note that in the current setting we have θ < 0.
As (17) is a minimization problem, we aim to apply theorem 2.5. For the bracketing functions w 1 and w 2 , we take the constant functions
where δ is a positive constant and m and M are as defined in (14).
The conditions of assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are all satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1, the arguments verifying conditions (a) to (c) are identical to those in section 3.2.1. To check condition (d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Similarly, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
and the last term is equal to w 2 (s, z). Hence, condition (d) of assumption 2.1 is verified. Furthermore, it is immediate from (18) that our choice of w 1 also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in (b) of assumption 2.3.
It only remains to check the value-concavity of Q. But this follows directly from the concavity of the function ψ defined in (15), as implied by θ < 0, along with linearity of the integral. We have now checked all conditions of theorem 2.5.
3.2.3. The Case 1 < ρ < γ. We now turn to the model in the case where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is still strictly great than 1 but intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than 1, as is commonly found in the literature.
11 As before, we apply the continuous transformationv ≡ v 1−γ to the Bellman equation (11) and, since 1 − γ < 0, the transformed counterpart leads us to the minimization problem as defined in (17).
Note that θ > 1 in the current setting.
for some positive δ < m, where m and M are as defined in (14).
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are again satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1, the arguments of verifying conditions (a) to (c) are identical to those in section 3.2.1. To check condition (d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
or, with some rearranging
Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds. In fact (19) implies that our choice of w 1 also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in (b) of assumption 2.3.
Value-concavity of Q is a direct consequence of the concavity of ψ, which holds again when θ > 1, along with linearity of the integral. The conclusions of theorem 2.5 now follow.
3.3. Risk Sensitive Preferences. In this section, we consider an economy with a representative agent having the risk sensitive preferences, as in, say, Hansen and Sargent (2008) , Gottardi et al. (2015) , or Bäuerle and Jaśkiewicz (2018) . The generic Bellman equation associated with risk sensitive preferences is
for each (s, z) ∈ S × Z. Here, r : G → R is a continuous one-period reward function. The parameter θ > 0 captures the risk sensitivity, while other primitives are as discussed in section 3.1. In particular, P is Feller, Γ is continuous and compact valued and both S and Z are compact.
Applying the continuous bijective transformationv ≡ exp(−θv) to v in the Bellman equation (20) leads to the minimization problem
We translate (21) to our environment by taking X := S × Z to be the state space, a = y ∈ S to be the action, and setting
Since r is continuous, there exists a finite constant M with |r| M. For the bracketing functions, we fix δ > 0 and take the constant functions
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are all satisfied. Regarding assumption 2.1, the steps verifying conditions (a) and (b) are identical to those in section 3.2.1. Condition (c) clearly holds, since, for any b ∈ R, the scalar map
and the last term is equal to w 2 (s, z). Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds. In addition, it is obvious from (24) that our choice of w 1 also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in part (b) of assumption 2.3.
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Finally, condition (a) of assumption 2.3, which is value-concavity of Q, follows from directly the concavity of the function φ defined in (23), along with linearity of the integral.
The conclusions of theorem 2.5 now follow.
3.4. Ambiguity. Extending earlier work by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Klibanoff et al. (2009), Ju and Miao (2012) propose and study a recursive smooth ambiguity model where lifetime value satisfies
with
As before, ρ is the reciprocal of the EIS and γ governs risk aversion, while η satisfies 0 < η = 1 and captures ambiguity aversion. If η = γ, the decision maker is ambiguity neutral and (25)- (26) reduces to the classical recursive utility model of Epstein and Zin (1989) . The decision maker displays ambiguity aversion if and only if γ < η. We focus primarily on the case 0 < ρ 1 < γ < η, which is the most empirically relevant.
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As a generic formulation of the preferences of Ju and Miao (2012), we consider the Bellman equation
where (s, z) ∈ S × Z. We assume both S and Z to be compact, Γ to be continuous and compact valued, F to be continuous and everywhere positive. The set Θ is a finite parameter space, each element of which is a vector of parameters in the specification of the exogenous state process. Given any θ ∈ Θ, the transition function π θ on Z is assumed to have the Feller property. Given any z ∈ Z, the distribution µ(z, ·) maps subsets of Θ to [0, 1] and evolves as a function of the exogenous state process. We suppose that µ is continuous in z for each θ ∈ Θ. 
for all (s, z) ∈ S × Z, where, here and below,
Since this transformation is bijective, there is a one-to-one correspondence between v andv, in the sense that v solves (27) if and only ifv solves (28). Note that in the current setting we have ξ 1 ∈ (0, 1) and ξ 2 < 0.
We translate this model to our environment by taking X := S × Z to be the state space, a = y to be the action taking values in S, and setting the state-action aggregator Q to
. (29) As (28) is a minimization problem, we aim to apply theorem 2.5. For the bracketing functions w 1 and w 2 , we fix δ > 0 and take the constant functions , z) , y) ∈ G, we have
where the first equality follows from directly the definition of Q and the fact that for any
with some rearranging, we obtain
Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 indeed holds true. Moreover, it is clear from (30) that our choice of w 1 also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in part (b) of assumption 2.3.
Condition (a) of assumption 2.3 (i.e., value-concavity of Q) is also satisfied, as shown in lemma 5.12 of the appendix. The conclusions of theorem 2.5 now follow.
3.4.2. The Case ρ = 1. In the limiting case with ρ = 1, the generic ambiguity recursion (26) becomes
where U t = ln V t .
14 The generic Bellman equation in (27) becomes
for each (s, z) ∈ S × Z. The one-period return function r is still assumed to be continuous but no longer restricted to be positive, while other primitives are as discussed in 
14 This specification connects with risk-sensitive control and robustness, as studied by Hansen and Sargent (2008) . In particular, there are two risk-sensitivity adjustments in (31).
With some rearranging, (33) can be written aŝ
Note that we still have ξ 1 ∈ (0, 1) and η > 1 in the current setting with ambiguity aversion. The state-action aggregator Q corresponding to (34) is
Since the return function r is continuous on a compact set, there exists a finite constant M such that |r| M. Hence for the bracketing function w 1 and w 2 , we fix δ > 0 and take the constant functions
As (34) is the minimization problem, we aim to apply theorem 2.5. Again, assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are all satisfied.
Regarding assumption 2.1, condition (a) is trivial. Conditions (b) and (c) follow from lemma 5.14 in the appendix. To check condition (d), observe that, for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have
Hence condition (d) of assumption 2.1 holds.
In fact, it is immediate from (36) that our choice of w 1 also satisfies the uniformly strict inequality in part (b) of assumption 2.3. Regarding part (a) of assumption 2.3, valueconcavity of Q is immediate from lemma 5.14. We have now checked all conditions of theorem 2.5, and hence the conclusions of that theorem now follow.
3.5. Narrow framing. In this section we study the recursive preferences that incorporate both first-order risk aversion and narrow framing, as in, say, Barberis et al. (2006) or Barberis and Huang (2009) , which can be expressed as
where b 0 0 is a parameter controlling the degree of narrow framing, whileG i,t+1 represents the specific gamble the agent is taking by investing in asset i whose uncertainty will be resolved between period t and t + 1.
15 First-order risk aversion is introduced through the piecewise linearity ofū(·). 16 Relative to the recursive specification in section 3.2, the new term prefixed by b 0 shows that the agent obtains utility directly from the outcomes of gambles {G i,t+1 } i over and above what those outcomes mean for total wealth risk, rather than just indirectly via its contribution to next period's wealth.
Other primitives are as discussed in section 3.2. For the parameters ρ and γ, we assume that either 1 < ρ < γ or ρ < 1 < γ.
Under the preceding preference specification, the generic Bellman equation becomes
As before, we suppose that the one-period return function r(s, y, z) is positive and continuous on G, while the aggregate gambling utility function B(s, y, z) is assumed to be nonnegative and continuous on G.
15 A zero value of the parameter b 0 means no narrow framing at all, while a large value of b 0 indicates that G i,t+1 is evaluated almost completely in isolation from other risks. 16 The piecewise-linear specification ofū(·) in Barberis et al. (2006) is defined byū(x) = x1{x 0} + λx1{x < 0} with λ > 1.
We again apply the continuous transformationv ≡ v 1−γ to the Bellman equation (37). As 1 − γ is negative, the transformed counterpart leads us to the minimization problem
where θ := (1 − γ)/(1 − ρ). The state-action aggregator is
Lemma 3.1. Let Q be as defined in (39). If either ρ < 1 < γ or 1 < ρ < γ, then there exist continuous strictly positive functions w 1 , w 2 on S × Z, w 1 < w 2 , such that (SL) there exists an ε > 0 such that Q((s, z), y, w 1 ) w 1 (s, z) + ε for all ((s, z), y) ∈ G;
The proof is deferred to the appendix. It only remains to check value-concavity of Q. But this follows directly from the concavity of ψ defined in (40), as implied by either ρ < 1 < γ or 1 < ρ < γ, along with linearity of the integral. Hence all conditions of theorem 2.5 are verified and the conclusions of that theorem follow.
UNBOUNDED REWARDS
This section gives an example of how the methodology proposed above can be extended to the setting of unbounded rewards. The application we consider is the Epstein-Zin problem of section 3.2.3, where 1 < ρ < γ, with Bellman equation
Dropping the compactness assumption, we allow S and Z to be arbitrary separable metric spaces containing possible values for the endogenous and exogenous state variables respectively. As before, P is Feller, Γ is compact valued and continuous, while r : G → R is continuous and β lies in (0, 1). Let θ be defined by
In addition, we make the following assumptions. 
Moreover, the map (y,
In what follows, given a real-valued continuous function defined on S × Z with (s,
As in section 3.2.3, we apply the continuous transformationv ≡ v 1−γ to the Bellman equation. Since 1 − γ < 0, the transformed counterpart leads us to a minimization problem with state-action aggregator
For the bracketing functions w 1 and w 2 , we fix δ such that 0 < δ < L, and then adopt the functions
Note that κ κ θ , since θ > 1 and κ 1. Hence w 1 and w 2 are both κ θ -bounded. In addition, the positivity and the continuity of κ directly imply the positivity and continuity of w 1 and w 2 . Hence, such w 1 and w 2 are positive κ θ -bounded continuous functions in R X with w 1 w 2 .
Let V and C be all Borel measurable functions v in R X satisfying w 1 v w 2 , and be the continuous functions in V respectively. For fixed σ ∈ Σ, a functionv σ ∈ V is called
The following proposition states a result for its existence and uniqueness.
Proposition 4.1. If assumption 4.1 holds, then, for each σ ∈ Σ, the set V contains exactly one
From this foundation, the minimum cost functionv * associated with this planning prob-
A functionv ∈ V is said to satisfy the Bellman equation if
In this connection, the corresponding Bellman operator S on C is defined through
Analogous to the result in bounded case (see, e.g., section 3.2.3), we have (b) Ifv is in C , then S nv →v * as n → ∞.
APPENDIX
Let mX represent all Borel measurable functions in R X and let cX denote all continuous functions in mX. Let bmX be the bounded functions in mX and let bcX be the continuous functions in bmX. Let mX + and mX ++ be the non-negative and positive functions in mX, respectively. Recall that a self map A on a convex subset M of bmX is called
• isotone if Av Av whenever v, v ∈ M with v v ,
Av whenever v, v ∈ M and 0 λ 1, and
For f , g ∈ bmX, the statement f g means that there exists an ε > 0 such that f (x) g(x) − ε for all x ∈ X.
For each σ ∈ Σ, we define the σ-value operator T σ on V by
Stating that v σ ∈ V solves (3) is equivalent to stating that v σ is a fixed point of T σ . By lemma 2.1, the operator T σ is a well defined self-map on V .
Proofs for the Convex Case.
Lemma 5.1. If assumption 2.2 holds, then, for each σ ∈ Σ, the operator T σ is asymptotically stable on V .
Proof of lemma 5.1. Fix σ ∈ Σ. We aim to apply theorem 3.1 of Du (1990) . To this end, it is sufficient to show that (i) T σ is isotone and convex on V .
(ii) T σ w 1 w 1 and T σ w 2 w 2 .
Regarding condition (i), pick any v, v ∈ V with v v . For fixed x ∈ X, we have
by (1). Hence, isotonicity of T σ holds.
To see that T σ is convex, fix v, v ∈ V and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given x ∈ X, we have
where the inequality directly follows from part (a) of assumption 2.2. Since x ∈ X was arbitrary, the convexity of T σ follows.
The first part of condition (ii) follows directly from (2), since, for each x ∈ X,
To see that the second part of condition (ii) is satisfied, it follows from part (b) of assumption 2.2 that
for each x ∈ X and for some ε > 0. Hence w 2 T σ w 2 , as was to be shown.
Proof of proposition 2.2. This follows directly from lemma 5.1.
Lemma 5.2. If v ∈ C , then there exists at least one v-maximal-greedy policy.
Proof. Fixing v ∈ C and using the compactness and continuity conditions in assumption 2.1, we can choose for each x ∈ X an action σ(x) ∈ Γ(x) such that (46) holds. The map σ constructed in this manner can be chosen to be Borel measurable by theorem 18.19 of Aliprantis and Border (2006) .
Lemma 5.3. If assumption 2.2 holds, then T is asymptotically stable on C .
Proof of lemma 5.3. In order to apply theorem 3.1 of Du (1990) , it suffices to show that (i) T is isotone and convex on C .
(ii) Tw 1 w 1 and Tw 2 w 2 .
The isotonicity of T on C is obvious, since, by the monotonicity restriction (1),
In other words, by definition of T, v v implies Tv Tv .
To show the convexity of T, fix v, v ∈ C and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given (x, a) ∈ G, we have, by part (a) of assumption 2.2,
Since (x, a) ∈ G was arbitrary, the above inequality implies
for each x ∈ X, which in turn means that
for each x ∈ X and for some ε > 0. Hence, Tw 2 w 2 , as was to be shown.
Theorem 5.4. If T σ is asymptotically stable on V for all σ ∈ Σ and T is asymptotically stable on C , then the conclusions of theorem 2.3 hold.
Proof. Let v * be the maximum value function and letv be the unique fixed point of T in C . To see thatv = v * , first observe thatv ∈ C and hencev has at least one maximalgreedy policy σ. For this policy we have, by definition, T σv (x) = Tv(x) at each x, from which it follows thatv = Tv = T σv . Since T σ is asymptotically stable on V , we know that its unique fixed point is v σ , sov = v σ . But thenv v * , by the definition of v * .
To see that the reverse inequality holds, pick any σ ∈ Σ. We have T σv Tv =v. Iterating on this inequality and using the isotonicity of T σ gives T k σv v for all k. Taking the limit with respect to k and using the asymptotic stability of T σ then gives v σ v.
Hence v * v, and we can now conclude thatv = v * .
Sincev ∈ C , we have v * ∈ C . It follows that v * is the unique solution to the Bellman maximization equation in C , and that T n v → v * whenever v ∈ C . Parts (a) and (b) of theorem 2.3 are now established.
Regarding part (c) and (d), by the definition of maximal-greedy policies, we know that
Since v * satisfies the Bellman maximization equation, we then have
But, by proposition 2.2, the right hand side is equivalent to the statement that v * = v σ . Hence, by this chain of logic and the definition of optimality,
Moreover, the fact that v * is in C combined with lemma 5.2 assures us that at least one v * -maximal-greedy policy exists. Each such policy is optimal, so the set of optimal policies is nonempty.
Proofs for the Concave Case.
Lemma 5.5. If assumption 2.3 holds, then, for each σ ∈ Σ, the operator T σ is asymptotically stable on V .
Proof of lemma 5.5. Fix σ ∈ Σ. We aim to apply theorem 3.1 of Du (1990) . To this end, it is sufficient to show that (i) T σ is isotone and concave on V , and
Clearly, T σ is isotone, since, by the monotonicity restriction (1),
In other words, v v implies
Regarding the concavity of T σ , fix v, v ∈ V and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given x ∈ X, by virtue of part (a) of assumption 2.3, we obtain
Since x ∈ X was arbitrary, the concavity of T σ follows.
To see that the first part of condition (ii) is satisfied, it follows from part (b) of assumption 2.3 that
for each x ∈ X and for some ε > 0. Hence, T σ w 1 w 1 , as was to be shown.
The second part of condition (ii) follows directly from (2), since, for each x ∈ X,
This completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 2.4. This follows directly from lemma 5.5.
Given v ∈ V , a policy σ in Σ will be called v-minimal-greedy if
Lemma 5.6. If v ∈ C , then there exists at least one v-minimal-greedy policy.
Proof. The proof of lemma 5.6 is essentially identical to that of lemma 5.2, and hence is omitted here.
Lemma 5.7. If assumption 2.3 holds, then S is asymptotically stable on C .
Proof of lemma 5.7. It follows from Berge's theorem of the minimum that, when v is in C , we have
Q (x, a, v) and Sv is an element of C .
In order to apply theorem 3.1 of Du (1990) , it suffices to show that (i) S is isotone and concave on C , and
(ii) Sw 1 w 1 and Sw 2 w 2 .
The isotonicity of S on C is obvious, since, by the monotonicity restriction (1),
In other words, by definition of S, v v implies Sv Sv .
To show the concavity of S, fix v, v ∈ C and λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given (x, a) ∈ G, by part (a) of assumption 2.3, we have
for each x ∈ X; namely, S[λv
Q(x, a, w 1 ) w 1 (x) + ε for each x ∈ X and some ε > 0. Hence, Sw 1 w 1 .
The second part of condition (ii) directly follows from (2), since, for each x ∈ X,
This finishes the proof.
Theorem 5.8. If T σ is asymptotically stable on V for all σ ∈ Σ and S is asymptotically stable on C , then the conclusions of theorem 2.5 hold.
Proof. Let v * be the minimum cost function and letv be the unique fixed point of S in C .
To see thatv = v * , first observe thatv ∈ C and hencev has at least one minimal-greedy policy σ. For this policy we have, by definition, T σv (x) = Sv(x) at each x, from which it follows thatv = Sv = T σv . Since T σ is asymptotically stable on V , we know that its unique fixed point is v σ , sov = v σ . But thenv v * , by the definition of v * in (7).
To see that the reverse inequality holds, pick any σ ∈ Σ. We have T σv Sv =v. Iterating on this inequality and using the isotonicity of T σ gives T k σv v for all k. Taking the limit with respect to k and using the asymptotic stability of T σ then gives v σ v.
Sincev ∈ C , we have v * ∈ C . Moreover, for v in C we can replace the inf in the definition of S with a min, and solutions to the Bellman equation in C exactly coincide with fixed points of S in that set. It follows that v * is the unique solution to the Bellman equation in C , and that S n v → v * whenever v ∈ C . Parts (a) and (b) of theorem 2.5 are now established.
Regarding part (c) and (d), by the definition of minimal-greedy policies, we know that
Since v * satisfies the Bellman equation, we then have
But, by proposition 2.4, the right hand side is equivalent to the statement that v * = v σ . Hence, by this chain of logic and the definition of optimality,
Moreover, the fact that v * is in C combined with lemma 5.6 assures us that at least one v * -minimal-greedy policy exists. Each such policy is optimal, so the set of optimal policies is nonempty.
5.3. Proofs for Section 3.4. In this section, we prove some properties of the state-action aggregator Q defined in section 3.4.
For the sake of exposition, fix θ ∈ Θ, we first define an operator R θ on bm(S × Z) + by
From this foundation, we then define an operator R that is a map sending w in bm(
The following lemma shows some useful properties of the operator R θ .
Lemma 5.9. For fixed θ ∈ Θ, if ξ 1 lies in (0, 1), then the operator R θ defined in (50) is isotone and concave on bm(S × Z) + .
Moreover, the function R θ w is nonnegative, bounded, and Borel measurable on S × Z whenever w ∈ bm(S × Z) + and continuous on S × Z whenever w ∈ bc(S × Z) + .
Proof of lemma 5.9. Fix θ ∈ Θ. The isotonicity of R θ is obvious, since the scalar function R + t → t ξ 1 ∈ R + and its inverse are both strictly increasing on R + .
Since ξ 1 ∈ (0, 1), by Theorem 198 of Hardy et al. (1934) , we know that R θ is superadditive in the sense that for any w, w ∈ m(S × Z) + , R θ (w + w ) R θ (w) + R θ (w ). of m(S × Z) + , we have
= λR θ (w) + (1 − λ)R θ (w ) (by positive homogeneity), as was to be shown.
Regarding the second claim of lemma 5.9, non-negativity and boundedness of R θ w is immediate and it is easy to see that R θ w is Borel measurable on S × Z whenever w ∈ bm(S × Z) + . Now fix w ∈ bc(S × Z) + . We note that the function w ξ 1 also lies in bc(S × Z) + . Then, by virtue of Feller property of π θ , the mapping S × Z (y, z) → w(y, z ) ξ 1 π θ (z, dz ) ∈ R + is bounded and continuous on S × Z. Furthermore, it follows that the mapping S × Z (y, z) → [ w(y, z ) ξ 1 π θ (z, dz )] 1/ξ 1 ∈ R + is continuous on S × Z, since the inverse of the map t → t ξ 1 is also continuous on R + . Therefore, our claim follows.
As an application of lemma 5.9, we now present the next result.
Lemma 5.10. The operator R defined in (51) is a well-defined map from bm(
Proof of lemma 5.10. Fix w in bm(S × Z) + . Since boundedness and non-negativity of the function Rw are obvious, it remains to show that Rw is measurable on S × Z × Θ.
On one hand, for each θ ∈ Θ, it follows from lemma 5.9 that the function Rw(·, ·, θ) = R θ w : S × Z → R + is Borel measurable. On the other hand, for each (y, z) ∈ S × Z, the function Rw(y, z, ·) : Θ → R + is continuous, since Θ is a finite set (endowed with the discrete topology).
In this connection, we conclude that the function Rw : S × Z × Θ → R is a Carathéodory function, in the sense that (1) for each θ ∈ Θ, the function Rw(·, ·, θ) : S × Z → R is Borel measurable; and (2) for each (y, z) ∈ S × Z, the function Rw(y, z, ·) : Θ → R is continuous.
By lemma 4.51 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) , it follows that the Carathéodory function Rw is jointly measurable on S × Z × Θ, as desired.
In this connection, the state-action aggregator Q defined in (29) can be simply expressed as a composition of two operators R andQ as follows
for all ((s, z), y) ∈ G and h ∈ bm(S × Z × Θ) ++ .
It is worth noting that the formula ofQ defined in (53) is almost identical to that of Q defined in (13). Hence, recalling the results associated with Q in section 3.2.2, we have Lemma 5.11. If ξ 2 < 0, thenQ defined in (53) is isotone and concave in its third argument on bm(S × Z × Θ) ++ .
In addition, the map ((s, z), y) →Q((s, z), y, h) is Borel measurable on G whenever h ∈ bm(S × Z × Θ) ++ , and continuous on G whenever the map h(·, ·, θ) : S × Z → R ++ is continuous, for each θ ∈ Θ.
Proof of lemma 5.11. Analogous to the proofs in section 3.2.2, for any fixed b > 0, we consider the scalar map ψ(t) := (b + βt 1/ξ 2 ) ξ 2 where t > 0. Since ξ 2 < 0, it is clear that the scalar function ψ is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave on R ++ (cf. section 3.2.2). The first part of claim is immediate from the monotonicity and concavity of ψ, along with monotonicity and linearity of the integral.
For the remaining part, fix h in bm(S × Z × Θ) ++ . Borel measurability of ((s, z), y) → Q((s, z), y, h) is obvious. Now fix a function h satisfying that the map h(·, ·, θ) : S × Z → R ++ is continuous, for every θ ∈ Θ. By virtue of the continuity imposed on the distribution µ(·, ·) and the finiteness of Θ, the map
is continuous on S × Z. It then follows from the continuity imposed on r and the continuity of ψ that ((s, z), y) →Q((s, z), y, h) is continuous on G.
Lemma 5.12. If ξ 1 ∈ (0, 1) and ξ 2 < 0, then the state-action aggregator Q defined in (29) is isotone and concave in its third argument on bm(S × Z) ++ .
In addition, the map ((s, z), y) → Q((s, z), y, v) is Borel measurable on G whenever v ∈ bm(S × Z) ++ and continuous on G whenever v ∈ bc(S × Z) ++ .
Proof of lemma 5.12. Since the aggregator Q is a composition ofQ and R, by lemmas 5.9
to 5.11, the isotonicity, Borel measurability and continuity of Q immediately follow from those ofQ and R.
It only remains to show the concavity of Q. To see this, fix ((s, z), y) ∈ G, λ ∈ [0, 1] and w, w in bm(S × Z) ++ . For any given θ ∈ Θ, by concavity of R θ and convexity of bm(S × Z) ++ , we have
In operator notation, this translates to
Observe that due to isotonicity and concavity ofQ, we now obtain
where the first and last equalities follow immediately from the definition of Q in (52), while the first and second inequalities follow from isotonicity and concavity ofQ, respectively. This completes the proof.
Analogously, the state-action aggregator Q defined in (35) can be expressed as
with the operator R defined as above, but
Observe that the formula ofQ defined above is almost identical to that of Q defined in (22). In this connection, recalling the results associated with Q in section 3.3, it is easy to see that Lemma 5.13. If η > 1, thenQ defined in (54) is isotone and concave in its third argument on bm(S × Z × Θ) ++ .
Proof of lemma 5.13. Analogous to the proof of lemma 5.11, for fixed b ∈ R, we consider the scalar map
It is clear that this scalar function ψ is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave on R ++ .
19 As a consequence, the remaining proof of lemma 5.13 is identical to that of lemma 5.11, and thus omitted here.
Lemma 5.14. If ξ 1 ∈ (0, 1) and η > 1, then the state-action aggregator Q defined in (35) is isotone and concave in its third argument on bm(S × Z) ++ .
Proof of lemma 5.14. Invoking lemmas 5.9, 5.10 and 5.13, the proof is identical to that of lemma 5.12, and hence is omitted.
Proofs for section 3.5.
Proof of lemma 3.1. Let constants m and M be as defined in (14 
Evidently, the uniformly strict inequality (55) implies that such a positive constant function w 1 satisfies condition (SL).
To prove our claim that there exists a positive constant function w 1 satisfying (55), we note that, since 0 < 1 − ρ < 1 and θ < 0, the following equivalence relation holds M + β w Since β ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ (0, 1), we have β 1/ρ − 1 < 0. Further, it follows from m > 0 and l 0 that the right-hand side of the above equality is negative. This, in turn, implies that for w 2 defined above, (56) is satisfied, which proves condition (U).
To see that w 1 < w 2 , observe that 0 < d < d * and 1 − γ < 0 imply 0 < w 1 ≡ (d * ) 1−γ < (d) 1−γ . In addition, since m M and θ < 0, we have (d) 1−γ ≡ [M/(1 − β 1/ρ )] θ [m/(1 − β 1/ρ )] θ ≡ w 2 . We can now conclude that w 1 < w 2 , as desired.
Case II : 1 < ρ < γ. For this case, the proof is similar. Regarding condition (SL) of lemma 3.1, we claim first that there exists a positive constant function w 1 such that for fixed ((s, z), y) ∈ G, we have Q((s, z), y, w 1 ) = r(s, y, z) + β w 
The uniformly strict inequality (57) implies that w 1 satisfies condition (SL).
To show that there exists a positive constant function w 1 satisfying (57), we note that, since 1 − ρ < 0 and θ > 1, the following equivalence relation holds m + β w Proof of lemma 5.17. To see that this is so, pick anyv ∈ C . By assumption 4.1, and by lemma 12.2.20 in Stachurski (2009) , we know that (y, z) → v(y, z )P(z, dz ) is continuous on S × Z. It then follows from the continuity of r that the map ((s, z), y) → Q((s, z), y,v) is continuous on G, as was to be shown.
Recall that the σ-value operator T σ on V is defined by T σv (s, z) = Q((s, z), σ(s, z),v) = r σ (s, z) + β v(σ(s, z), z )P(z, dz )
1/θ θ for all (s, z) ∈ S × Z andv ∈ V , where r σ (s, z) := r(s, σ(s, z), z).
Lemma 5.18. If assumption 4.1 holds, then, for each σ ∈ Σ, the operator T σ is asymptotically stable on V .
Proof of lemma 5.18. First, we show that T σ is a self-map on V . Fixv in V . Together with continuity of r, measurabilities ofv and σ imply that T σv is Borel measurable on S × Z. In addition, since w 1 v, making use of isotonicity of Q (as shown in lemma 5.15), we have w 1 (s, z) Q((s, z), σ(s, z), w 1 ) Q((s, z), σ(s, z),v) for all (s, z) ∈ S × Z, which in turn implies that w 1 T σv . A similar argument gives T σv w 2 . Therefore, T σv ∈ V , as was to be shown. Now, invoking lemmas 5.15 and 5.16, theorem 3.1 of Du (1990) applies and implies the stated result.
Proof of proposition 4.1. This follows immediately from lemma 5.18.
Givenv ∈ V , a policy σ in Σ will be calledv-greedy if σ(s, z) ∈ argmin y∈Γ(s,z) Q((s, z), y,v) for all (s, z) ∈ S × Z.
Lemma 5.19. Ifv ∈ C , then there exists at least onev-greedy policy.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of lemma 5.6.
